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Abstract—This paper presents a novel security mechanism for 
sensitive data stored, acquired or processed by a complex 
electronic circuit implemented as System-on-Chip (SoC) on an 
FPGA reconfigurable device. Such circuits are increasingly used 
in embedded or cyber systems employed in civil and military 
applications. Managing security in the overarching SoC presents 
a challenge as part of the process of securing such systems. The 
proposed new method is based on encrypted and authenticated 
communications between the microprocessor cores, FPGA fabric 
and peripherals inside the SoC. The encryption resides in a key 
generated with Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) circuits and 
a pseudorandom generator. The conceptual design of the security 
circuit was validated through hardware implementation, testing 
and analysis of results. 
Keywords—physically unclonable functions, pseudorandm 
generators, security, system-on-chip, embedded system 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The modern Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) 
combines the programmability of processors with the 
performance of custom hardware. Due to their advantages, 
FPGAs have become the primary computational element in 
many critical embedded systems. Face recognition systems, 
wireless networks, intrusion detection systems and 
supercomputers, all of which are employed in large security 
applications, also use FPGAs [1]. As most other circuits, 
systems implemented on FPGAs require secure operations and 
communications. Design outsourcing has become increasingly 
common over the past 15 years for Integrated Circuits (ICs) 
generally and in particular for SoCs. In particular, a tendency to 
outsource the design and verification of the Intellectual 
Property (IP) core circuits and the manufacturing of integrated 
circuits can be noticed. Because of the globalization of the 
semiconductor design and fabrication processes, ICs are 
becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious activities and 
alterations. Even if the participants are reliable, attacks like 
reverse engineering the bitstream, side channels attacks, 
manipulating the design through JTAG, initiating single events 
upset to cause functional changes to the design and other 
security attacks against embedded systems could appear. An 
example of a general model of multibit Differential Power 
Analysis (DPA) attacks to precharged buses, with emphasis on 
symmetric-key cryptography algorithms, is discussed in [2].  
Modern computer systems are built on a foundation of 
software components from a variety of vendors. While critical 
applications may undergo extensive testing and evaluation 
procedures, the heterogeneity of software sources threatens the 
integrity of the execution environment for these trusted 
programs [3]. A similar case applies to SoCs: modern SoCs are 
built on a foundation of IP cores from a variety of vendors. 
Integration of untrusted third-party IPs into a SoC design is a 
major challenge in establishing trustworthiness of the entire 
SoC. 
The proposed method is based on hardware isolation of 
peripherals that process critical data from peripherals that 
process ordinary data and on an encrypted data transfer inside 
the SoC, between microprocessor(s) and peripherals. The 
isolation and encryption are implemented at the hardware layer.  
A range of countermeasures against embedded systems 
security attacks were developed and analyzed. Those 
mentioned further refer only to information encryption or 
application isolation at hardware level. A microprocessor 
designed for executing computer programs which are stored 
encrypted in memories to prevent software piracy is presented 
in [4].  Another architecture with execute-only code, which is 
stored in an encrypted form and may be decrypted by the 
instruction-loading path on the main processor chip, is 
introduced in [5].  In [6] the focus is on physical non-invasive 
attacks – or board level attacks – conducted on buses between 
the SoC and off-chip volatile memory or directly in the 
memory. The method presented ensures the confidentiality of 
the off-chip memory content during storage or execution in 
order to prevent the leakage of any sensitive information. It also 
ensures its integrity to forbid execution of intentionally altered 
data. The authors of [7] present a summary of the homomorphic 
encryption that consists of computations carried out on 
ciphertext, thus generating an encrypted result which, when 
decrypted, matches the result of operations performed on 
unencrypted data. However, these computations involve 
complex resources and high computing time, thus making them 
inappropriate for embedded systems or SoC. The concept 
presented in this paper takes security a step forward and 
encrypts the transferred data between peripherals inside a SoC.   
Separation and isolation are fundamental to the design of 
cryptographic devices. They may be found in many forms, from 
hardware to application at the architecture level. The authors of 
[8] present an approach which achieves information flow 
isolation between trusted and untrusted IP cores. Their method 
- , Gate-level information-flow tracking (GLIFT) - uses 
additional logic to monitor the security level of every bit in the 
system as they flow through Boolean gates. GLIFT associates a 
single-bit security label to each data-bit and tracks this 
information as it flows through the system [8]. Another 
mechanism based on isolation, physical isolation this time, is 
presented in [9]. They proposed a spatial isolation mechanism 
called a moat and a controlled sharing mechanism called a 
drawbridge. A moat surrounds a core with a channel in which 
routing is disabled; drawbridges allow signals to cross moats, 
letting the cores communicate with the outside world. The aim 
of this physical isolation is to counteract some attacks against 
SoC security.  
The concept presented in this paper uses logical isolation 
between microprocessors and peripherals according to the 
sensitivity of transferred information. The security protocol 
introduced is based on data encryption/decryption with a 
symmetric cryptographic algorithm, trying to maintain the 
performance and the latency of the system. The symmetric 
algorithm is a pseudorandom generator (PRG) one, starting 
with a unique device value generated with physically 
unclonable functions (PUF) circuits and computing pseudo 
random cryptographic keys with Salsa20/20. An overview of 
the most important implementation details and experimental 
results for the PUFs is presented in [21], whereas the Salsa20/20 
is introduced in [22].  
II. SOC THREAT MODEL 
Generally, cryptography applications or security 
mechanisms involve computations based on one or more secret 
keys. The security of a cryptosystem is only as strong as the 
secrecy of the key. Thus, some of the most effective attacks on 
a cryptosystem are based on finding flaws in the protocol that 
manages the keys. Attacks that may be thwarted by the 
introduced method are shown bellow.  
One threat model for SoC is represented by physical attacks. 
Physical attacks against ICs assume the physical investigation 
of IC in order to obtain some sensitive information. Physical 
investigation of an IC refers to researching the parts of the IC 
that are not available through normal input/output pins. For 
example, attackers may inspect the IC layout in order to obtain 
the secret key. Those types of attacks are hard to achieve due to 
high equipment costs. Even so, there are companies specialized 
in reverse engineering that analyze the circuits and structure of 
semiconductors and electronic systems that may lead to 
disclosure of secrets -one of them is Chipworks.  
Bus monitoring attacks are another type of security threat 
against SoC. The bus between the SoC and memory is one of 
the most vulnerable points in the system: an adversary may 
easily listen on bus in order to extract information from the 
system. Bus monitoring attacks could also reveal access 
patterns to memories which may reveal sensitive information. 
For example, AES implementations use table of precomputed 
values. The order in which the table entries are accessed can 
reveal secret information [10]. Andrew “bunnie” Huang shows 
in [11] an attack against Xbox video game console from 
Microsoft, demonstrating that the bus is one of the weakest 
points in an embedded system. Although the code is stored 
encrypted in memory, the instructions are transferred in clear 
on the bus. Thus, code can be easily intercepted and the high 
speed of the bus is not a security protocol against bus snooping 
attacks.  
In modern embedded systems, cores communicate with each 
other via shared bus. Unfortunately, the shared nature of 
traditional bus architecture raises several security issues. 
Malicious cores can obtain secrets by snooping on the bus. In 
addition, the bus can be used as a covert channel to leak secret 
data from one core to another. One of the IP cores (for example, 
the Ethernet controller) may contain a malicious hardware 
modification, a Trojan hardware that could leak information 
and secret keys that are being transferred between peripherals 
via bus. A hardware Trojan is a malicious modification of 
hardware during design or fabrication which causes an IC to 
have altered functional behavior with security consequences. A 
possible example of hardware Trojan insertion is presented in 
[12]. Israeli jets bombed a suspected nuclear installation in 
northeastern Syria. It was not long before military and 
technology bloggers concluded that this was an incident of 
electronic warfare. Post after post speculated that commercial 
off-the-shelf microprocessors in the Syrian radar might have 
been purposely fabricated with a hidden “backdoor”. By 
sending a preprogrammed code to those chips, an unknown 
antagonist had disrupted the chips’ function and temporarily 
blocked the radar.  
III. SOC THREAT MODEL 
The security concept of this paper consists of an analysis 
between computer networks and SoCs. Due to their complexity 
and possible attacks, SoCs may be viewed as a computer 
network: the SoC microprocessors represent the computer 
network servers, and the SoC peripherals represent the 
computer network clients. In terms of security threats, SoC is 
also similar with some computer networks attacks: spoofing 
attacks, when a malicious IP core can impersonate another one, 
covert channel to leak secret data from one core to another, or 
memory attacks for reading or overwriting the critical data. The 
newly introduced method aims to experimentally validate and 
analyze the use of cryptographic- based operations 
(encryption/decryption, authentication) inside SoCs with 
minimum costs in terms of hardware resources or performance. 
The mechanism consists of the following methodology: 
A. Dividing SoC peripherals into domains 
The security protocol is based on logical isolation of sensitive 
IP cores and non-sensitive IP cores. Sensitive IP cores refer to 
IP cores that process sensitive information like passwords, 
information involved in cryptographic operations that may lead 
to disclosure of critical data. It is required to divide the SoC 
peripherals in critical and non-critical domains. The critical 
domain contains information flow which processes sensitive 
data. The processor and peripherals from the non-critical 
domain process trivial information. In this way, information 
level isolation is carried out. The division of IP cores into 
critical IP cores and non-critical IP cores is performed by a trust 
person such as the architecture system. 
B. Generating PUF secret keys 
The secret key is generated using PUF circuits. A PUF is a 
circuit that measures the inherent and random manufacturing 
variations presented in a device in order to generate a unique 
signature/cryptographic key in response to an input (challenge). 
PUF circuits are implemented as hard macros, this meaning that 
every instance is built identically: the gates are placed on the 
same locations and the propagation times between the gates are 
identical for any two instances. Theoretically, the responses of 
the PUF circuits have the same value, even if the instances are 
placed on different FPGAs/ICs or on the same FPGA/IC but in 
different locations. Practically, there will be differences 
between the responses of PUF circuits due to process variations. 
To instantiate multiple PUF circuits, a cryptographic key 
unique to each FPGA/IC due to uniqueness of process 
variations may be created. The FPGA or IC may be divided in 
a convenient number of sub-circuits, and for each sub-circuit a 
PUF secret key may be generated. One sub-circuit with one 
PUF secret key is associated with one domain from Section A. 
An integrated circuit may be seen as several smaller integrated 
circuits.  
C. Encryption and Decryption 
This step involves the addition of a wrapper beside 
peripherals and microprocessors containing the necessary 
mechanism to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data inside the 
critical domain. The wrapper contains a cryptographic key, 
pseudorandom generator, and the control logic in order to 
encrypt or decrypt the data transmitted or received. The 
microprocessor from the critical domain must also have the 
possibility to encrypt or decrypt the data stored in memories. 
The transfer between peripherals inside the SoCs or 
embedded systems is quickly made during a few clock cycles 
(generally one clock cycle). In order to maintain the 
performance of the system, the encryption/decryption 
operations should not alter the transfer time between the IP 
cores. In order to define an efficient protocol, (running in 
one/two clock cycles), a stream cipher was used, where the 
plaintext digits are combined with a pseudorandom cipher digit 
stream (keystream). The key is a pseudo random bit string as 
long as the message. The message is XORed with the key, 
which assumes a very fast encryption and decryption algorithm. 
The security mechanism must offer the possibility to generate 
the same key both at the transmitter and the receiver: each 
peripheral has a wrapper that contains the key generation 
mechanism. Furthermore, the mechanisms inside one domain 
are synchronized. With this mechanism, the messages 
transferred on shared bus are encrypted. When one encrypted 
message is transferred on the system bus, all the peripherals 
inside the domain have the possibility to generate the decrypted 
key using PUF circuits. Fig. 1 shows the general encrypted 
mechanism between the microprocessor and one peripheral 
inside a domain.  
D. Data transfer between domains 
It is possible to have information that must be exchanged 
between different critical domains. In this case, it is necessary 
to generate a common key between two domains. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Encryption Scheme between Microprocessor and Peripherals. 
Another key with the same length as the transferred messages 
may be generated using PUF circuits, in both domains. The 
PUF circuits may be chosen from the ones used to generate the 
input data for PRG. Considering that the keys are generated 
using the PUF circuits and according to experimental results, 
obtained by [17, 21] regarding the Hamming inter-distance, it 
may be considered that the difference in bits between the two 
keys is around 50%. Thus, an error correcting code to correct 
the n/2-1 bits from the total length of n bits may be applied for 
each key. The scheme of generating a common cryptographic 
key from two binary sequences with 49% different bits is 
described below. The BCH error correcting code consisting of 
two steps has been used: 
a) The helper data phase. This phase, illustrated in Fig. 
2a, is used only once per domain. It takes the 
cryptographic key generated by PUF circuits and 
generates helper data. The helper data will be available 
in the non-critical domain in order to reconstruct the 
common secret key. This stage corresponds to the 
encoding stage. 
b) The secret key generation phase. This stage, 
summarized in Fig. 2b, involves the reconstruction of 
the common cryptographic key. The common 
cryptographic key from the non-critical domain is 
generated using the key generated with PUF circuits 
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from the non-critical domain and the helper data from 
the critical domain. This stage corresponds to BCH 
decoding algorithm.  
Both stages are run by both domains. The first stage is run only 
once and the results (helper data from the first domain and 
helper data from the second domain) will be stored in registers. 
In each domain, an n-bit sequence is generated. The difference 
between the two sequences on the same FPGA/IC is around 
50%. With the help of BCH encoding, a binary sequence named 
helper data, and capable of correcting 49% bits from the total 
length of cryptographic key, is generated in each domain. By 
changing helper data between the two domains, and applying 
BCH decoding, each domain may regenerate the same binary 
sequence starting from the domain cryptographic key and the 
helper data of the other one – for the first critical domain it is 
the PUF cryptographic key with half of the bits corrected and 
for the second critical domain it is the domain PUF 
cryptographic key with half of the bits corrected. The maximum 
number of different bits between the two cryptographic keys is 
half of the total number of bits. The same binary sequence 
inside each domain will therefore be obtained.  
 
Fig. 2a. First Phase: BCH Encoding. 
 
Fig. 2b. Second Phase: BCH 
Decoding.  
Fig. 3 presents the general mechanism applied on a general 
SoC, which may be a complex system with one or n 
microprocessors. According to the application goals, the 
microprocessors, along with peripherals, may be grouped in 
more domains. Each domain consists of one microprocessor 
and at least one peripheral. A cryptographic key is generated for 
each domain and available to microprocessor and peripherals 
belonging to that domain. The domains considered with 
sensitive data are featured with the wrapper summary presented 
in point c). A simple example of SoC is presented in Fig. 4. The 
system may be used to remotely monitor a private space: the 
owner or a trusted person authenticates through the 
authentication module and receives images through an Ethernet 
connection. Even if the system is provided with an 
authentication module, the system is susceptible to security 
attacks both from software or hardware. One attack scenario 
may imply leakage of sensitive information that may be 
triggered by possible hidden hardware mechanisms inserted in 
IP cores or software deliberate vulnerabilities. Also, both 
processors have access to public key cryptography module and 
DRAM memory. If microprocessor 2 is compromised, it may 
read sensitive information and send it through Ethernet. Also, 
one of the IP cores (for example, the Ethernet controller) may 
contain a malicious hardware modification and the Trojan could 
leak confidential information and secret keys which are 
transferred between peripherals via the shared bus. 
Unfortunately, the shared nature of traditional bus architecture 
raises several security issues. Malicious cores can obtain secrets 
by snooping on the bus. Bus monitoring attacks are also 
possible. The attacks attach bus monitoring to the memory bus 
and wait for the secret data to be loaded from RAM into the 
CPU or vice versa. Considering the attacks and the application 
of the system presented in Fig. 4, the peripherals (processor 1, 
processor2 public key cryptography module, DRAM memory, 
Ethernet controller, ADC controller) may be classified into two 
domains.  The first domain is composed of processor 1, ADC 
controller, DRAM memory, and public key criptography 
module. The second domain contains processor 2, Ethernet 
controller, DRAM memory, and public key cryptography 
module. The first domain may be considered the critical 
domain, in which data will be exchanged considering the 
encryption set of rules.   
IV. SECURITY PROTOCOL 
The concept presented in the above Section aims to 
counteract the attacks presented in the SoC Threat Model 
Section. 
The physical attacks that aim to reveal secret information 
such as cryptographic keys or sensitive data are counteracted 
with the introduced mechanism. First of all, the cryptographic 
keys are embedded in the structure of FPGA/IC and any attempt 
to disclose their values lead to disruption of FPGA/IC and 
implicitly the SoC or embedded system. This is the most 
valuable property of PUF circuits. Second of all, the sensitive 
information is stored as a crypto text inside the memories or 
local peripheral registers due to the encryption/decryption 
mechanism. The second type of attacks based on bus 
monitoring or snooping may also be counteracted. Even if an 
attack leaks sensitive information, the informarion is encrypted 
using a pseudorandom generator based on PUF circuits. 
Practically, it is hard to generate keys with perfect secrecy. This 
implies that the total length of generated keys (the space of the 
keys) must be grater than the total length of the messages (the 
space of messages). To practically achieve this, a 
pseudorandom key generator is used. A pseudorandom 
generator (PRG) for a class of statistical tests is a deterministic 
procedure that maps a random seed to a longer pseudorandom 
string such that no statistical test in the class can distinguish 
between the output of the generator and the uniform 
distribution. The PRG and the seed generated with PUF circuits 
make theoretically impossible to decrypt the crypto text 
captured through bus monitoring. The same explanation is valid 
for IP cores information leakage due to hardware trojans 
insertion or software malicious modifications. Salsa20/20 
starting with values generated with PUF circuits was used as a 
pseudorandom generator. The problem with using the Salsa 
PRG for encryption and decryption in System on Chip is that 
the length of the stream cipher is 
702  bytes = 732 bits and the 
length of the messages is 32 bits = 
52 . It is possible to encrypt 
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still small for a system on chip running continuously for 
decades or more. In order to increase the size of the output space 
of the original PRG, it is possible to build new PRGs out of old 
PRGs. For a fixed key and a nonce there are 
682  pseudorandom 
keys of 32 bits length generated with Salsa20/20 PRG. It is 
possible to use those pseudorandom keys as a nonce input or 
key input into another Salsa20/20 PRG. However, the sequence 
of the PRG is different between devices and between domains 
due to differences in PRG inputs: the PUF cryptographic keys. 
 
Fig. 3. General System on Chip.  
 
 
Fig. 4. System on Chip. 
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results are correlated with the methodology presented in 
Section III. All the implementations were done on Spartan 3E 
FPGA, XC3S500E and Virtex 4, XC4VFX20.  
A. Dividing SoC peripherals into domains 
The Spartan 3E is a small FPGA family with limited 
hardware resources. However, the FPGA may be divided in 
small areas, one for each SoC domain. In each area, the PUF 
circuits and the IP cores may be manually placed and routed 
using Xilinx Planahead or Xilinx FPGA Editor. Placing and 
routing may be controlled using Xilinx Synthesis Constraints. 
In case of complex designs, larger FPGAs may be considered.  
B. Generating PUF secret keys 
This subject was widely discussed in [15 16, 17, 18] and a 
brief description is presented below. Despite many PUF circuits 
presented in scientific literature, few of them are suitable for 
FPGA implementations due to routing complexity and 
limitations. After analyzing most Silicon circuits, two of them 
were found to be appropriate for FPGA implementations: the 
Ring Oscillator PUF and the Latch Based PUF. Instantiating 
more PUF circuits from the same type, a cryptographic key is 
generated based on process variations and embedded in 
physical FPGA structure. The main properties of PUF circuits 
(randomness and uniqueness) were analyzed in [15, 16, 17] 
which considered 30 identical Spartan 3E devices. The use of 
the Ring Oscillator PUF and the latch based PUF to generate a 
unique identifier for FPGA devices are validated through the 
results obtained. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that 
distinct IDs on the same FPGA and distinct IDs for each domain 
or IP cores may exist on the same device. This will allow the 
implementation of the presented security protocol where IP 
cores are divided into different security level domains, and each 
domain has a different PUF ID.  
C. Encryption and Decryption 
The security protocol assumes to adjoin a wrapper that has 
access to the sequence generated with PUF for one domain and 
contains a pseudorandom generator. The chosen pseudorandom 
generator is Salsa20/20. Mathematical details and 
implementation are presented in [19]. Salsa20 generates the 
stream in 64-byte (512) blocks. It maps a 256-bit key, a 64-bit 
nonce, and a 64-bit stream position to a 512 bit output. The key 
is generated using 128 PUF circuits and the value is 
concatenated two times in order to obtain 256-bit key. Each 
block is an independent hash of the key, the nonce, and a 64-bit 
block number; there is no chaining from one block to the next.  
The Salsa20 encryption function is a long chain of three 
simple operations on 32-bit words: 32-bit additions, 32-bit 
exclusive-or and constant-distance 32 bit rotation. Salsa20/20 
starts with an initial state, first applies the operations for 
columns and then for rows. It repeats this 20 times and the final 
phase adds the initial state to the final result. The Salsa20 
algorithm computes the pseudorandom value; 512 bits are 
generated in 21 clock cycles. The messages transferred on the 
system are presented in Fig. 1 and are 32 bits in length. In order 
to experimentally analyze the security concept, each peripheral 
was featured with this wrapper. The implementation of 
Salsa20/20 core was made on a Spartan 3E board and the 
summary of device utilization may be seen in Fig. 5. The 
frequency after synthesis is 139.451 MHz. 
 
Fig. 5 Hardware resources for Salsa20/20. 
The proposed theoretical security concept was validated 
using a SoC implemented on Spartan 3E FPGA, XC3S500E 
and Virtex 4, XC4VFX20, using IP cores from the rich library 
Bus System
Up1_1
Ip1_1 Ip1_n
Up2_1
Ip2_1 Ip2_n
Up1_1
Ip1_1 Ip1_n
Up2_1
Ip2_1 Ip2_n
PUF_1 PUF_2
PUF_3
PUF_4
Upm_1
Ipm_1 Ipm_n
PUF_m
Encryption/
Decryption
Authentication
Key Generation
Encryption/
Decryption
Authentication
Key Generation
Processor1
Processor2
ADC
DRAM Public Key 
Cryptography
Ethernet
User input
Data from external 
world
HDMI 
User output
available in the Xilinx IP Catalog. The security mechanism 
introduced in this paper may be used inside SoCs implemented 
with both IP cores imported from different libraries or in-house 
developed custom IP cores. The experimental implementation 
has two approaches. The first approach uses the simulation 
model of Xilinx IP Cores and attaches a wrapper besides 
peripherals and microprocessor and it corresponds to the case 
when access to the input/output interface and to the logic 
implementation is allowed. The first approach may be applied 
when IP core designers implement the security mechanism. The 
second approach uses a coprocessor together with processor in 
order to encrypt/decrypt the data. The second approach 
corresponds to the case where access to the input/output 
interfaces or to the logic implementation is not allowed. In the 
second approach, the system architecture (which uses the IP 
Cores from third parties) integrates both the peripherals and the 
security mechanism. Both approaches were implemented in 
Xilinx EDK and simulated using Isim Simulator in order to 
validate the results. The values obtained from PUF generators 
are missing in the simulation. Their values may be used only in 
the hardware implementations.  
1) The First approach 
In order to show that the security concept may be 
implemented in a real application, a simple SoC was created 
with Xilinx IP Cores: Microblaze microprocessor, a custom 
cryptographic (crypto) peripheral with two read/write registers 
and a GPIO configured for LEDs. The communication inside 
SoC between peripherals is made through Xilinx PLB bus. The 
system is presented in Fig. 6. The microprocessor runs a simple 
C program that reads the value from register 0 of the crypto 
peripheral, increments the value, and writes back to the register 
and to the GPIO for LEDs. The communication between 
microprocessor and crypto peripheral must be encrypted 
involving that both the microprocessor and crypto peripheral 
need the encryption/decryption mechanism. In order to adjoin 
the wrapper it is necessary to understand the PLB bus protocol 
and the Microblaze architecture. The signals used for data 
transfer in case of PLB bus, Microblaze microprocessor and 
crypto peripheral are presented in Fig. 7, Fig. 8 and Fig. 9.  
Because of its instruction set architecture, Microblaze is similar 
to the RISC-based architecture described in [13]. In general, 
most Microblaze instructions are executed in one clock cycle, 
maintaining single-cycle throughput [14]. In order to encrypt 
and decrypt the data sent or received by Microblaze two 
instructions are important: LW and SW. LW rA, rB, RD loads 
a word from the word aligned memory location that results from 
adding the contents of register rA and rB. The data is placed in 
register rD. SW rA, rB, rD stores the contents of register rD, 
into the word aligned memory location that results from adding 
the contents of registers rA and rB [14].  
 
Fig. 6. System on Chip implemented on FPGA. 
 
Fig. 7. PLB signals. 
 
Fig. 8. Microblaze signals. 
 
Fig. 9. Custom peripheral signals. 
The sequence of signals corresponding to a write operation 
executed by Microblaze is described further. Crypto peripheral 
register 0 is loaded with the decimal value “10” through the SW 
assembly instruction. The pseudorandom cryptographic key is 
active 4 clock cycles. This timing was chosen in order to 
synchronize the microprocessor pseudo random generator with 
the peripheral pseudo random generator. The choice was made 
based on instruction execution latency and the number of cycles 
necessary for a bus transfer. In the case of crypto peripheral, the 
pseudo generator mechanism is delayed with one clock cycle in 
order to synchronize the data transfer which has one clock cycle 
latency. For example, the data transferred between Microblaze 
and crypto peripheral has the value 0x0000000a and the pseudo 
random cryptographic key used for encryption/decryption has 
the value 0x1e68c1ce. Therefore the encrypted value sent on 
the PLB bus has the value 0x1e68c1c1.  
The sequence of signals corresponding to a read operation 
executed by Microblaze is described further. It is a SW 
assembly instruction: the Microblaze copies the value from 
register 0 of crypto peripheral into one of its data registers. Fig. 
10 indicates that the data read by Microblaze from the crypto 
peripheral has the value 0x00000014 and the pseudo random 
cryptographic key used for encryption/decryption has the value 
0x391d1ea3.  
2) The Second approach 
A coprocessor in order to encrypt/decrypt the received or 
transmitted data by or from microprocessor had been added. 
This version with IP cores from Xilinx IP Catalog may also be 
tested both on simulation and hardware. The coprocessor is a 
custom IP core that connects to the microprocessor through 
special buses. The software application has special functions in 
order to use the coprocessor. For the security protocol the 
coprocessor contains the PUF generated cryptographic key and 
the Salsa20/20 pseudorandom generator. In case of Microblaze 
and coprocessor, there is a special bus named FSL (Fast 
Simplex Link) available in the IP Catalog. The coprocessor is 
connected to Microblaze as can be seen in Fig. 10. In order to 
send data to coprocessor and to read data from processor, two 
software instructions are implemented: write_into_fsl(value) 
and read_from_fsl(value). Each of the two instructions has a 
latency of 5 clock cycles. After 10 clock cycles, Microblaze has 
the encrypted data and it can start the data transfer to another 
peripheral. The total cycle for transfer and encryption of the 
data between Microblaze and a peripheral is 19 clock cycles. 
 
Fig. 10. Coprocessor connected to Microblaze. 
The details regarding the sequence of signals for data transfer 
between Microblaze and a peripheral was presented in the first 
approach. Considering that each of the two operations of 
reading and writing have a latency of 19 clock cycles, the 
encryption and decryption are made combinational. Given  that 
the Salsa20/20 (based on PUF circuits) generates the PRG key 
in 21 clock cycles, the mechanisms from Microblaze and 
peripheral are sychronized; one instance of Salsa20/20 was 
used. The hardware resources occupied by the SoC with 
coprocessor for crypotgraphic operations, on Virtex 4, 
xc4vfx20, are presented in Fig. 11. 
 
Fig. 11 Hardware resources. 
The validation of the proposed method is achieved through 
implementation results. The encryption\decryption mechanism 
does not affect the system’s performance or the system’s 
latency. There is a cost of hardware resources for 
implementation of this method, which is worth paying when it 
comes to application security. However, in most designs, the 
cost of hardware resources is preferable to the cost of 
performance or speed.  
D. Data transfer between domains 
In the case presented in this paper, the data width is 32 bits 
length. This means that a shared key between two domains with 
32 bits width length is needed. In this case, in each domain, 32 
bits may be considered from the total 128 bits generated with 
PUF circuits. From these 32 bits, a 32 bits length shared key 
may be obtained using the methodology with BCH encoding 
and decoding. The shared key may be used to encrypt the data 
using combinational operations to scramble the bits between the 
data and the shared key. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The paper presents a theoretical concept for a complex SoC 
with more than one microprocessor and validates 
experimentally its significant benefits through a simple 
implementation of cryptographic operations in a SoC. The 
hardware implementation can easily be extended to 
accommodate a more complex SoC.   
The method presented in this paper uses symmetric key 
algorithms in order to thwart some security issues against SoC. 
Considering other research results reported in this field, it can 
be stated that the encryption/decryption mechanism is for the 
first time introduced at the SoC level, between IP cores. The 
typical disadvantage of using symmetric key algorithms – 
obtaining the same cryptographic key for both encryption of 
plaintext and decryption of ciphertext - was eliminated by the 
use of PUF circuits and Salsa20/20 PRG. Adding the PUF 
circuits at the core of a PRG increases the randomness in the 
generator. The experimental results show that the 
performance/speed of symmetric key algorithms may be used 
to construct a security mechanism at hardware level between 
the IP cores.  
Given that a hardware implementation is much faster than a 
software one, the concept presented is based on hardware 
layers: PUF circuits are implemented on the physical layer, 
whereas the wrapper is added on soft or hard IP cores 
implemented in hardware description languages.  
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